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THE ETHICAL DIMENSION OF NATIONAL
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CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR.*
I'd like to thank the organizers of this most important symposium
for the opportunity to address you. I can hardly think of a more timely
topic for our consideration than Law, Ethics, and the War on Terror,
and I'm glad to have the opportunity to share some thoughts on some
of the ethical challenges of our national security law practitioners.
Like any lawyer, I'd like to begin by addressing our terminology.
Exactly what do we mean by the "War on Terror"? As you probably
have heard from other sources, it is almost a clich6 these days to say
that you cannot have a "war on terror" because terror is a tactic, not
an entity against which war can be waged.
Without necessarily disagreeing with the technical correctness of
that view, I nevertheless believe it is useful to examine human conflict
from the perspective of confronting adversaries for whom the law
does not present any restraint and for whom exploitation of
adherence to the rule of law is the norm. The word "terror" conveys
exactly such a lawless approach. So in that sense, the phrase "war on
terror" is useful shorthand for describing the conflict we find
ourselves waging against a variety of actors on the world stage.
Paradoxically, no other conflict of this scale in human history has
so involved the law. In today's military, few military commanders
attempt to wage war without bringing along their lawyers. This is not
because they have somehow fallen in love with the legal profession,
but rather, it is a simple recognition that failure to account for-and
adhere to-the law can seriously frustrate mission success.
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In short, concern about the law is a very pragmatic response to a
phenomenon that is as real as logistics, communications, or any of the
more traditional concerns of a military leader. Parenthetically, as you
advise your clients about legal issues and, indeed, doing the proverbial
"right thing," it helps if you can tap into something that resonates
pragmatically with them. In the case of adherence to the law in
military operations, it is clear that illegalities can be as serious a
setback as any traditional military defeat. Abu Ghraib is "exhibit one"
in this regard.'
There are many reasons for the legal complexity of modern
military operations. I believe it has much to do with globalization,
which requires legal instruments and international legal fora to
facilitate commerce. In a real way, globalization has raised the
consciousness of law around the world and has served to normalize its
utility. In any event, it is no longer true, as Cicero asserted, that in
times of war, the law falls silent One need only open a newspaper to
understand that law is actually quite vocal these days.
As already indicated, the fact that many of the threats we face
today are not posed by the traditional nation-state significantly
complicates the advisory task for the national security law
practitioner. We often find ourselves in an almost endless "threshold"
debate as to what law applies. For example, when should a law
enforcement legal regime apply to a particular situation, and when
should the law of war analysis govern? My friend Ken Roth of Human
Rights Watch suggested a set of criteria that the government must
consider before applying a law of war regime. Specifically, he says that
the government must demonstrate:
[F]irst, that an organized group is directing repeated acts of
violence against the United States, its citizens, or its interests
with sufficient intensity that it can be fairly recognized as an
armed conflict; second, that the suspect is an active member of
an opposing armed force or is an active participant in the
violence; and, third, that law enforcement means are
unavailable.3
1. See, e.g., Tom Brokaw, Sanchez: Abu Ghraib 'Clearly A Defeat', MSNBC.COM,
Jun. 30, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5333895.
2. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONs 223 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., 6th ed.
2004) ("Silent enim leges inter arma.").
3. Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War on Terror, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb.




Notwithstanding this guidance, it will not furnish national security
law practitioners the simplistic, bright-line answers that our clients
crave. You cannot write a "cookbook" that provides a quick reference
answer to every factual scenario that might arise. As difficult as this
may make a national security practice, I believe it is best to keep these
questions fact-dependant-that is, the application of the appropriate
r6gime must take into account a thorough analysis of the particular
circumstances.
This brings me to my first observation about ethics-that is, the
duty to be competent. This obligation is embedded at several points in
our Air Force Rules of Professional Conduct (which largely mirror the
American Bar Association Model Rules), beginning with the very first
rule.4 In my experience the competency issue for national security law
practitioners arises with respect to the law, per se, much less often
than it does with regard to the ability to understand the facts in order
to be able to apply them to the law.
Understanding the facts in national security situations can be
quite challenging at times. For example, imagine finding yourself
assigned to an Air Operations Center,5 where we have military
lawyers on duty around-the-clock. That position requires our
attorneys to advise commanders on the legality of airstrikes.
4. Compare DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, TJS-2, AIR FORCE RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2005), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2008).
5. See DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, OPERATIONS AND ORGANIZATION: AIR FORCE
DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2, at ch. 7 (2007) (discussing Air and Space Operations Centers),
available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service-pubs/afdd2.pdf; see also Anna
Mulrine, Targeting the Enemy: Inside the Air Force's Control Center for Iraq and
Afghanistan, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 9, 2008, at 26; Anna Mulrine,
Lawyers Review Airstrike Plans: An Extra Check on Actions When There is the
Risk of Civilian Casualties, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 29, 2008,
http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/world/2008/05/29/lawyers-review-airstrike-plans.html
[hereinafter Lawyers Review Airstrike Plans].
6. Lawyers Review Airstrike Plans, supra note 5.
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There are many factors to such a determination. You must apply
the rules of engagement, which usually contain a heavy dose of policy
limitations, as well as the traditional law of war. The policy issues
could be quite complex. In his book about Kosovo, Waging Modern
War, General Wesley Clark recounts the sheer technical difficulty in
providing decision-makers with extremely detailed information about
targets-much more than the law of war would require-in order to
obtain approval.' Moreover, to apply the traditional law of war, you
would need to employ a proportionality analysis. Typically, we apply
the standard found in Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions (even
though the U.S. is not a party to it), and this would mean determining
whether the expected incidental death or injury to civilians or the loss
of their property as a result of the airstrike "would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage [sought]." 8 In
addition, if there is "a choice.., between several military objectives
for obtaining a similar military advantage, [then] the objective to be
selected shall be [the one] expected to cause the least danger to
civilian lives and to civilian objects." 9 Of course, overlaying all of this
is the need to "take all reasonable precautions to avoid losses of
civilian lives and damage to civilian objects.' 0
As you think about how to advise on these issues, it becomes
clear rather quickly that it is necessary to know quite a bit about
military operations and precisely how they are carried out. What facts
constitute adequate "military advantage" in order to tolerate the
deaths of innocent civilians? To warrant the destruction of certain
civilian property? How viable are the alternatives? What is reasonable
under the exigencies of combat?
7. WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR: BOSNIA, KOSOVO, AND THE
FUTURE OF COMBAT 201 (2001).
8. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 57, para.
2(b), adopted June 10, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. Although the U.S. is not a party to Protocol
I, military lawyers often refer to it for guidance, and parts of it are considered customary
international law.
9. Id. at para. 3.
10. Id. at para. 4.
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As to the latter, much effort these days goes to training our
lawyers about the whole process of air warfare. This is more than just
learning to interpret photos and other intelligence data but also
necessitates a lot of familiarity with technical features of various
weapons, including their fusing and their blast patterns. For example,
the exact moment that a bomb explodes can make a huge difference
in the amount of collateral damage. A microsecond difference in the
fusing of a bomb could make the explosion contained within a
targeted compound-or not.
Ideally, you become able to offer a better alternative that meets
military needs yet minimizes collateral damage. This requirement for
technical expertise is hardly limited to the application of kinetics on
the battlefield. Some of the trickiest questions arise in the cyber
realm. For example, one of the classic questions that remains a
challenge is when a particular cyber activity crosses the line from a
law enforcement matter to one properly considered to reside in the
law of armed conflict realm.
Professor Michael Schmitt, a retired Air Force Judge Advocate-
or "JAG"-proposed an analytical test which essentially takes the
position that once a cyber activity in effect equates to the kinetics of a
traditional armed attack, the law of armed conflict regime applies."
Yet as helpful as this is, it still requires real expertise in substantive
cyber matters to apply the test that, like all tests, demands subjective
evaluation of complex facts.
2
I mention all this because I cannot emphasize strongly enough
that in order to be a competent legal advisor on national security
matters, it is imperative that the lawyer become a student of national
security. It is not enough to have even an encyclopedic knowledge of
the law, it is necessary to have a rather in-depth substantive
knowledge of the client's "business," so to speak.
11. See Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
885, 934-36 (1999).
12. Professor Schmitt sets forth a multi-factor test for analyzing a computer network
attack under international law, with a particular view toward the United Nations Charter.
His analysis turns on such questions as whether an attack is "intended to directly cause
physical damage to ... objects or injury to human beings," whether the "consequences [of
the attack] track those consequence commonalities which characterize armed force," and
whether principles such as self-defense are applicable. Id. Professor Schmitt's test uses
similar questions in order to evaluate the appropriateness of a response by armed force to
such an attack.
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We need this expertise not just to provide legal advice
competently but also to obtain and maintain the client's confidence. In
the armed forces particularly, if a commander gets the sense that the
lawyer-uniformed or civilian-does not fully grasp the military
dimension of the issue, the lawyer's continued effectiveness is in real
jeopardy. And in war, there may not be a second chance to make a
good first impression.
So how can a practitioner build substantive competence? There
really is no easy way. It likely means a rather rigorous course of self-
study that requires reading classic works of military history and
strategy, as well as staying familiar with the up-to-the-minute
developments in the technologies and strategies of war often best
reflected in not just military journals and trade publications but
increasingly the rather sophisticated array of online resources to
include blogs.
That said, I firmly believe that national security law is not-and
should not be-the exclusive purview of military and other
government attorneys. In fact, I often urge law students to take
national security law courses even if they have no current plans to
serve in government.
The reason is that national security issues, whether we like it or
not, provide context for much of what occurs in this country, not to
mention around the world. The front page of virtually every
newspaper has some reference to some aspect of national security, an
activity which is, in essence, a nearly $600 billion "business" in this
country.13 I believe every lawyer these days, regardless of his or her
practice, ought to be familiar with the basics of national security law.
Apart from everything else, lawyers ought to be the ones
ensuring that debates about critical policies and issues are framed
correctly from the legal perspective. Is this not part of our
responsibility as legal professionals? It is remarkable to me how often
the law itself is misunderstood or misstated. Accuracy as to what the
law provides, as well as its rationale, is vitally important today because
it is increasingly clear that our adversaries are trying to turn our
respect for the rule of law into a weapon to be used against us.
13. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE U.S., HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, at
tbl.3.1 (2007), available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/hist.pdf.
[Vol. 50:789
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I call this phenomena "lawfare" and define it as "the strategy of
using-or misusing-law as a substitute for traditional military means
to achieve an operational objective., 14 The perception of illegality can
have powerful effects on the ability of democracies to wage war. As
Professor Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou explained in their
1994 book, The Laws of War:
In modern popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict
requires a substantial base of popular support. That support can
erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no matter how worthy the
political objective, if people believe that the war is being
conducted in an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way.15
Accordingly, talking about the importance of legal and ethical
behavior to my military clients has a very practical rationale. Military
operations need to be legal both in fact and-importantly-in
perception. I would especially invite your attention to the word
"believe" in the quote above. In other words, an erroneous belief
about what the law provides can undermine worthy efforts.
Our adversaries see great benefit in creating confused beliefs in
this regard. For example, recently we have seen a concerted effort by
the Taliban to delegitimize the use of airpower in Afghanistan
through a sophisticated campaign to propagandize civilian casualties.
They want to do so because airpower has become the weapon that
they fear the most. Here is what one Taliban commander has said:
"Tanks and armor are not a big deal. The fighters are the killers. I can
handle everything but the jet fighters.""' The way the Taliban and al
Qaeda are seeking to counter coalition airpower is not through some
kind of anti-aircraft weapon but by intermingling with civilians to
discourage airstrikes by raising the specter of innocents dying
unnecessarily. In addition to propagandizing deaths that do occur as a
result of their actions, they are very clever about disinformation and
fabrication. All of this is to create the impression, as Riesman and
Antoniou might put it, that "the war is being conducted in an unfair,
inhumane, or iniquitous way."17
14. Charlie Dunlap, Lawfare in Modern Conflicts, REPORTER, Oct. 3, 2005, at 95, 95
(edited transcript of remarks given by Major General Dunlap at the Keystone Leadership
Summit on October 3, 2005).
15. THE LAWS OF WAR: A COMPREHENSIVE COLLECTION OF PRIMARY
DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL LAWS GOVERNING ARMED CONFLICT, at xxiv (W.
Michael Reisman & Chris T. Antoniou eds., 1994).
16. Rowan Scarborough, Pentagon Notebook: McPeak Calls McCain Too Fat, WASH.
TIMES, Jun. 26, 2008, at B1 (quoting "U.S. intelligence officials").
17. LAWS OF WAR, supra note 15, at xxiv.
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The response by the U.S. and Western powers to this
manipulation has not always been as effective as it needs to be. Most
people realize that using human shields is wrong, but there seems to
be markedly less understanding of what the law actually provides.
While every civilian death is a tragedy, the law recognizes that they do
inevitably occur. Therefore, the law only prohibits "excessive"
casualties in relation to the military advantage anticipated.
Furthermore, it is absolutely imperative that national security
practitioners understand the rationale behind the law in order to
provide advice to those well-meaning decision-makers who want, for
example, to ban the use of airstrikes if there is any chance of civilians
being present.
Of course, the law does not require any such rule because if it
were put into effect, it would simply encourage belligerents to
maximize their intermingling with civilians as a way of protecting
themselves from the air weapon. In the case of terrorists, if they can
be protected from an airstrike, they then can survive to kill innocents
in any number of illegal and wholly depraved ways.
Understanding the second order effects of legal advice brings me
to the next ethical point I wish to make, and this is the one set forth in
Rule 2.1. That rule says:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political
factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation."
The advisory function of national security practitioners is
particularly important in today's extremely complex national security
environment. In her highly acclaimed 2008 book, The Dark Side,
author Jane Mayer severely criticizes the performance of some
lawyers in national security decision-making. She argues that "[w]hat
was missing was a discussion of policy-not just what was legal, but
what was moral, ethical, right, and smart to do."'9
In fact, it was consideration of exactly those matters that brought
military lawyers into conflict with some of their civilian counterparts
in recent years. In truly incisive analysis, Professor Richard Schragger
of the University of Virginia Law School, contrasts JAG conceptions
from those of other government attorneys. He notes that:
18. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2008).
19. JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON
TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 55 (2008).
[Vol. 50:789
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Military lawyers seem to conceive of the rule of law
differently [than civilian government lawyers]. Instead of seeing
law as a barrier to the exercise of the clients' power, these
attorneys understand the law as a prerequisite to the meaningful
exercise of power .... Law makes just wars possible by creating
a well-defined legal space within which individual soldiers can
act without resorting to their own personal moral codes.20
Consequently, JAGs frame their advice with a keen
understanding that whatever is approved may well have to be
executed in a split-second decision by a teenage soldier. Legal advice
that requires the soldier-client to conduct a hyper-legalistic analysis in
the midst of the chaos and extreme stress of combat is not just
unwelcome but also extremely dangerous. Thus, military lawyers
understand that advice that only speaks to technical legality does a
disservice to the client.
At the same time, the practitioner must not allow these other
factors to cloud unambiguous and candid advice to the client as to
what the law specifically requires. In his searing book indicting the
role some senior government attorneys allegedly played in the
development of legal memoranda authorizing coercive interrogation
for detainees, author Philippe Sands makes a number of interesting
observations.2 The lawyers' shortcoming, he argues, was their failure
to "provide independent advice and instead [they became] advocates
for a cause.,
2
It is a mistake to think, however, that the issue only applies to
government lawyers. Consider this story from the New York Times
concerning a plan by the American Civil Liberties Union and the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers to provide
attorneys for Guantanamo detainees.23 After noting that some lawyers
signed on to the effort "were expecting to use the detainees' cases to
expose what they see as flaws in the Bush administration's war-crimes
system," the Times reported:
20. Richard Schragger, Cooler Heads: The Difference Between the President's
Lawyers and the Military's, SLATE, Sept. 20, 2006,
http://www.slate.com/id/2150050/?nav/navoa.
21. See generally PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD'S MEMO AND THE
BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN VALUES (2008) (discussing the history and effects of the
Haynes Memo in recommending new interrogation methods for detainees).
22. Id. at 230.
23. See William Glaberson & Neil A. Lewis, 2 Groups to Help Defend Detainees at
Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2008, at A16.
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In some cases there has been friction between the civilian and
the military lawyers. One lawyer who is involved in the military
defense effort said... there could be tensions over the extent to
which legal efforts focus on defending individual detainees and
how much they focus on challenging the entire military
24
commission system.
In short, taking into account moral, economic, social, and political
considerations should not become a rationale for partisanship and
ideological proselytizing that undermines the lawyer's ethical
responsibility to be a zealous advocate for his or her individual client.
For military lawyers not assigned to represent an individual, the
client is the United States, and sometimes that can create tensions
with our political masters. It is certainly true that an administration is
free to implement whatever policies it wishes, so long as they comply
with the law. Military lawyers especially must be scrupulously
apolitical and strongly advocate the principle of civilian control of the
military. At the same time, however, they must be conscious of their
duty to provide independent and candid counsel.
This is not always easy to do. As Jane Mayer notes, the
circulation of the original draft of the military commissions order in
late 2001 alarmed more than civil libertarians. Mayer writes:
"Uniformed military lawyers were galvanized by the order into taking
the first steps in what would become a remarkable role as defenders
of America's honor.., against what they saw as illegitimate and
ruinous incursions .... 25 Many of you no doubt know that later there
were disputes about interrogation techniques and other issues related
to what we call today the "War on Terror."26
24. Id.
25. MAYER, supra note 19, at 88.
26. See, e.g., CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 179-80 (2007)
(discussing how "the top uniformed lawyers . . . erupted" over memorandums that
concluded that "it would be lawful to inflict cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment on
Guantinamo detainees, and that the anti-torture statute 'does not apply to the conduct of
U.S. personnel' at Guantinamo").
[Vol. 50:789
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I think it is important to understand that military lawyers raised
the concerns at times when it was hardly popular to do so and at a
time when the nation was in the grip of what even Philippe Sands
concedes was a fear of further attacks that was "palpable and real.,
27
Today, as a result of legislation that followed these disputes, the
ability of military lawyers to provide independent legal advice without
interference is protected by law.' That was not, however, the case
before 2004.
Indeed, it is remarkable how much times have changed. No
doubt, many of you recall the now infamous Charles "Cully" Stimson
episode where the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Detainee Affairs was rightly excoriated for suggesting that business
clients should bring pressure on their civilian law firms to abandon
representation of detainees. The Washington Post editorialized,
appropriately enough, that the lawyers were "upholding the highest
ethical traditions of the bar by taking on the most unpopular of
defendants.
29
While they were certainly "upholding the highest ethical
traditions of the bar," I am not so sure that defending detainees is all
that unpopular these days. In May of 2008, a Seattle newspaper
reported the following from a civilian lawyer representing a detainee:
"I had always worried that we would get some input from
clients that was less than supportive," [the defense counsel] said.
"But we must have gotten 10 e-mails, phone calls, personal
contacts from Fortune 500 companies that said the opposite.
One big client said, 'That makes me want to send you more
work-not less."'
30
I would suggest, however, that such popularity could be quite
fragile. If we have another horrific incident along the lines of 9/11-as
many experts predict will happen-or even one much less devastating,
I believe that public opinion could change rapidly and radically.
27. SANDS, supra note 21, at 224.
28. See 10 U.S.C. § 8037(f) (2006).
29. Editorial, Unveiled Threats: A Bush Appointee's Crude Gambit on Detainees'
Legal Rights, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2007, at A18.
30. Paul Shukovsky, Firm's Unlikely Client: Bin Laden's Ex-Driver Seattle Lawyers
Taking on Bush, Guantanamo, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 27, 2008, at Al
(quoting Harry Schneider).
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How will we, as lawyers, react? I say all this to highlight that no
set of ethical rules or legislation is effective absent the moral courage
to speak truth to power when necessary and appropriate. In the
military, physical courage traditionally defines a warrior; however, in
the future it may well change.
Although it is certainly true that national security law
practitioners-both military and civilian-are finding themselves in
harm's way today,3" duty and ethical responsibility make further
demands. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals made the
following observation in a somewhat different context in a 1990 case:
[W]e opine that there are two kinds of courage involved in the
profession of arms and the profession of law. On the one hand,
many are called upon for physical courage. On the other hand,
judges are called upon from time to time for moral courage-
the courage to subordinate a personal philosophy of the law or
private distaste... to decide an issue logically and
dispassionately.32
I think what the court said about judges must be extended to the
whole national security law practitioner community. We must steel
ourselves for the day when we must make hard, unpopular decisions
that are open to widespread dispute because of the passions of the
day.
This is not to say that we should not aggressively seek proper
methodologies to safeguard our nation; after all, as Justice Jackson
wrote in Terminiello v. Chicago,33 the Constitution is not a "suicide
pact."3 Difficult accommodations must be made to address legitimate
security needs in the context of preserving individuals' rights. As the
late Supreme Court Justice William R. Rehnquist put it:
In wartime, reason and history both suggest that this balance
shifts to some degree in favor of order-in favor of the
government's ability to deal with conditions that threaten the
national well-being. It simply cannot be said, therefore, that in
every conflict between individual liberty and governmental
authority the former should prevail.35
31. See, e.g., Bill Graham, Locals Mourn Army Major, KANSAS CITY STAR, Jan. 12,
2006, at B1; James V. Grimaldi, Army's JAG Corps Deals with Reality of War in Iraq,
WASH. POST, Nov. 17,2003, at El.
32. United States v. Stidman, 29 M.J. 999,1002 (A.F.C.M.R. 1990).
33. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
34. Id. at 37 (Jackson, J., dissenting).




Still, the Constitution is also not a blank check. Americans
understand that there is a sliding scale at work, where security may be
sacrificed for freedom and individual rights, and-sometimes-vice
versa. The Supreme Court's recent decision overturning the District
of Columbia's gun ban will no doubt result in the deaths of innocent
people as, inevitably, criminals will have easier access to weapons.
This is the price we pay for our way of life and its emphasis on
individual rights and freedoms.
As lawyers, probably as much as any profession, we are in the
business of telling our clients what they need to hear as opposed to
necessarily what they want to hear. I think that perhaps the greatest
ethical lesson since 9/11 is that lawyers must be prepared to give that
needed, albeit unwanted, advice at times when it is least personally
opportune. Yes, those that stood up in the past have been largely
vindicated, and those that wrote the convoluted legal opinions that
sought to justify what is now generally considered wrong have been
mostly vilified. But even Sands concedes that "it will be said that these
lawyers acted in what they thought to be the best interests of the
country."37
I would suggest that we cannot necessarily count on vindication
given the wholly unpredictable nature of the issues that could arise in
the future. The real measure of our character and, indeed, our ethics is
when we must do the right thing under circumstances where there will
clearly be a heavy personal cost. We may find ourselves alone. But,
it's in those defining moments where true courage is found.
Accordingly, I would invite your attention to the remarks of
another lawyer who had to make hard, wartime decisions, Abraham
Lincoln. At the height of the Civil War in 1863 he said: "I desire to so
conduct the affairs of this Administration that if, at the end, when I
come to lay down the reins of power, I have lost every other friend on
earth, I shall at least have one friend left, and that friend shall be
down inside of me., 38 Those are certainly our watchwords for an
uncertain future.
36. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2854-55 (2008) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
37. SANDS, supra note 21, at 230.
38. IDA M. TARBELL, 2 THE LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 175 (Lincoln Mem'l Ass'n
1900).
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